2013 FEB -6 PN 3: 02

UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT WASHINGTON, D.C. CLERK OF COURT

IN RE ORDERS AND RECORDS OF THIS COURT RELATED TO THE SURVEILLANCE OF CARTER PAGE

No. Misc. 18- 01

MOTION OF ADAM GOLDMAN, CHARLIE SAVAGE, AND THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY FOR PUBLICATION OF COURT RECORDS

David E. McCraw Vice President & Assistant General Counsel THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY 620 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10018 Phone: 212-556-4031 Fax: 212-556-1009

Christina Koningisor THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY Legal Department 620 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10018 Phone: (212) 556-1985 Fax: (212) 556-4634 Email: christina.koningisor@nytimes.com

David A. Schulz MEDIA FREEDOM & INFORMATION ACCESS CLINIC **ABRAMS INSTITUTE** 1675 Broadway, 19th Floor New York, NY 10019 Phone: (212) 850-6103 Email: schulzd@ballardspahr.com

John Langford Hannah Bloch-Wehba **MEDIA FREEDOM & INFORMATION** ACCESS CLINIC **ABRAMS INSTITUTE** Yale Law School P.O. Box 208215 New Haven, CT 06520 Phone: (203) 436-5831 Fax: (203) 432-3034 Email: john.langford@ylsclinics.org

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 62 of this Court's Rules of Procedure, reporters Adam Goldman and Charlie Savage and The New York Times Company ("Movants") move the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") to order publication of all of its orders authorizing surveillance of Carter Page, a United States citizen, together with the application materials and renewal application materials upon which those orders were issued.

On February 2, 2018, President Trump declassified a memorandum authored under the direction of Rep. Devin Nunes, Chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ("HPSCI") concerning the surveillance of Mr. Page, who had served briefly as a foreign affairs advisor to the Trump Campaign in 2016. The Nunes Memorandum disclosed the existence of multiple orders issued by this Court authorizing surveillance of Mr. Page after his departure from the Trump campaign, and purported to detail the facts upon which those orders were issued. Following the presidential declassification, it was promptly released to the public by HPSCI.

Even before release of the Nunes Memorandum, speculation about the surveillance of Carter Page had been at the center of heated national debates over potential abuses of the government's surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as well as the provenance and propriety of an ongoing investigation by Special Counsel Robert Mueller into potential collusion between the Trump Campaign and the government of Russia during the 2016 Presidential Election. The now-public Nunes Memorandum was prepared solely by Republican members of the HPSCI. Its release over the strenuous objections of the Democratic members of that Committee, the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation has fueled a further intense debate over the validity of the memorandum's depiction of the factual basis and motivation for the surveillance of Mr. Page. Given the overwhelming public interest in assessing the accuracy of the Nunes Memorandum and knowing the actual basis for the Page surveillance orders, Movants respectfully request this Court to direct the publication of its orders authorizing the surveillance of Mr. Page and the application materials upon which they were issued, with only such limited redactions as may be essential to preserve information that remains properly classified notwithstanding the declassification and dissemination of the Nunes Memorandum.

BACKGROUND

A. Electronic Surveillance Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") requires the government to obtain a warrant from the FISC before it may conduct domestic electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information. 50 U.S.C. § 1802.¹ To obtain a warrant, the government must submit a warrant application to the FISC. *Id.* § 1804(a). The application must include a sworn statement by a federal officer of the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the government's belief that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. *Id.* § 1804(a)(3).

Upon receiving a warrant application, a FISC judge can enter an order approving surveillance only if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. *Id.* § 1805(a)(2). The order may only authorize surveillance for up to ninety days. *Id.* § 1805(d)(1). If the government wishes to continue surveillance beyond ninety days, it must file an application for an extension that meets the same requirements as the initial warrant application and obtain a renewal order from the FISC. *Id.* § 1805(d)(2).

¹ FISA provides three narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement for electronic surveillance, none of which are relevant here. *See* 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a), 1805(f), 1811.

Typically, the public never learns of the existence or contents of a specific FISA warrant or any related materials. Warrant applications are made *ex parte*; FISC orders authorizing surveillance are entered *ex parte*; and the entire record of FISC proceedings, including warrant applications and related orders, are classified and maintained under security measures. *See id.* §§ 1803(c), 1805(a). It is highly unusual for the public to learn of the existence of a specific FISA warrant as has occurred here.

B. Declassification of the Existence of the Carter Page FISA Warrant and the Contents of the Initial Warrant Application and Renewal Applications

On January 29, 2018, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence voted to disclose a memorandum (the "Nunes Memo") revealing the existence of a FISA warrant for the electronic surveillance of Carter Page, who served as a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign until September 2016.² Under Rule X of the House of Representatives, the President had five days to object to the Nunes Memo's disclosure. Instead, President Trump declassified the Nunes Memo on February 2, 2018. Langford Decl. Ex. A.

The Nunes Memo reveals that on October 21, 2016, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and Federal Bureau of Intelligence ("FBI") "sought and received a FISA probable cause order . . . authorizing electronic surveillance on Carter Page from the FISC." *Id.* at 3. The FBI and DOJ subsequently applied for and received three FISA renewals from the FISC, extending the surveillance of Page. *Id.*

² See Nicholas Fandos, House Republicans Vote to Release Secret Memo On Russia Inquiry, N.Y. Times (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/29/us/politics/release-the-memovote-house-intelligence-republicans.html; Charlie Savage & Sharon LaFraniere, Republicans Claim Surveillance Power Abuses in Russia Inquiry, N.Y. Times (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/us/politics/republicans-surveillance-trump-russiainquiry.html.

The Nunes Memo discloses that the initial warrant application and two renewal

applications were signed by then-Director James Comey on behalf of the FBI; a final renewal

application was signed by Deputy Director Andrew McCabe. Id. For the DOJ, former-Deputy

Attorney General Sally Yates, former-Acting Deputy Attorney General Dana Boente, and

Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein each signed one or more of the FISA warrant

applications. Id.

The Nunes Memo further discloses some of the content of the applications, as well as

certain purported omissions it identifies:

- "[t]he 'dossier' compiled by Christopher Steele . . . on behalf of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Hillary Clinton campaign formed an essential part of the Carter Page FISA application",³
- "[n]either the initial application in October 2016, nor any of the renewals, disclose or reference the role of the DNC, Clinton Campaign, or any party/campaign in funding Steele's efforts";
- "[t]he initial FISA application notes [Christopher] Steele was working for a named U.S. Person, but does not name Fusion GPS and principal Glenn Simpson";
- "[t]he [initial] application does not mention Steele was ultimately working on behalf of—and paid by—the Clinton campaign, or that the FBI had separately authorized payment to Steele for the same information";
- "[t]he Carter Page FISA application . . . cited extensively a September 23, 2016, *Yahoo News* article by Michael Isikoff, which focuses on Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow";
- "[t]he Page FISA application . . . assesses that Steele did not directly provide information to *Yahoo News*";
- none of the Page FISA applications reference that, in September 2016, Steele reportedly told then-Associate Deputy Attorney General Bruce Ohr that he "was desperate that Donald Trump not get elected and was passionate about him not being president";

³ Notably, the Steele dossier is publically available: https://www.documentcloud.org/ documents/3259984-Trump-Intelligence-Allegations.html.

- none of the applications reference Ohr's relationship with Steele and Fusion GPS, including that Ohr's wife was employed by Fusion GPS;
- "the FISA application relied on Steele's past record of credible reporting on other unrelated matters," but did not disclose Steele's reported "anti-Trump financial and ideological motivations"; and
- "[t]he Page FISA application . . . mentions information regarding fellow Trump campaign advisor George Papadopoulos."

Id. at 4-6.

C. Reaction to Disclosure of the Nunes Memo

The Nunes Memo's release has precipitated a national debate on FISA, the role of the

FISC, and the potential for the government to abuse its surveillance authority.⁴ It has also further

fueled the debate over the propriety of Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation into

collusion between the Trump Campaign and Russia during the 2016 Presidential Election.⁵

Publication of the Nunes Memo has additionally sparked an intense debate over the

accuracy of its characterization of the Page warrant applications. Notably, Democrats on the

HPSCI have authored a 10-page memorandum responding to the Nunes Memo, which remains

⁵ See, e.g., Byron Tau & Rebecca Ballhaus, Memo's Release Escalates Clash Over Russia Probe; Trump Says It 'Totally Vindicates' Him, Wall St. J. (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-releases-gop-surveillance-memo-1517592392; Matthew Nussbaum, How the Nunes Memo Became The Latest Political Football in the Russia Investigation, Politico (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/01/nunes-memofbi-russia-investigation-383172; Noah Bookbinder et al., Nunes Memo Aims at Russia probe, Backfires on Trump and GOP, USA Today (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ opinion/2018/02/03/nunes-memo-aims-russia-probe-backfires-trump-and-gop-bookbinder-eisenfredrickson-column/303240002/.

⁴ See, e.g., Charlie Savage, How to Get a Wiretap to Spy on Americans, and Why That Matters Now, N.Y. Times (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/29/us/politics/fisasurveillance-applications-how-they-work.html; James Freeman, Opinion, Obama and the FISA Court: Both of Their Reputations Cannot Survive the Collusion Investigation, Wall St. J. (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-and-the-fisa-court-1517608555; Jim Geraghty, The FBI's Least Defensible Decision, As Revealed in the Nunes Memo, Nat'l Rev. (Feb. 2, 2018), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/456054/fbis-least-defensible-decision-revealed-nunesmemo.

classified.⁶ The Democrats' memorandum reportedly rebuts the Nunes Memo's contention that the FISC was not told of Steele's political motivations.⁷ In addition, sources report that the FBI did tell this Court that the information it received from Steele was politically motivated, though the agency did not say it was financed by Democrats.⁸ The Justice Department reportedly made "ample disclosure of relevant, material facts" to the Court that revealed "the research was being paid for by a political entity," according to an unnamed official familiar with the matter.⁹ None of the accusations in the Nunes Memo nor the denials by knowledgeable sources can be confirmed without access to the records of this Court whose release is now requested by Movants.

JURISDICTION

As an inferior federal court established by Congress under Article III, this Court possesses inherent powers, including "supervisory power over its own records and files." *Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc.*, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978); *accord Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) ("It has long been understood that [c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution." (quotation marks omitted)).¹⁰

⁷ Id.

⁸ Id.

⁶ Nicholas Fandos, Adam Goldman & Charlie Savage, *House Republicans Release Secret Memo Accusing Russia Investigators of Bias*, N.Y. Times (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/02/us/politics/trump-fbi-memo.html.

⁹ Ellen Nakashima, Justice Department Told Court of Source's Political Influence in Request to Wiretap Ex-Trump Campaign Aide, Officials Say, Wash. Post. (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-dept-told-court-of-sourcespolitical-bias-in-request-to-wiretap-ex-trump-campaign-aide-officials-say/2018/02/02/caecfa86-0852-11e8-8777-2a059f168dd2_story.html.

In addition, FISA specifically grants this Court power to "establish such rules and procedures, and take such actions, as are reasonably necessary to administer their responsibilities" under the statute. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(g)(1). Pursuant to that authority, this Court has issued Rules of Procedure permitting FISC judges to direct the publication of FISC orders, opinions, and "related record[s]" "sua sponte or on a motion by a party." FISC Rule of Procedure 62.

ARGUMENT

I. THIS COURT MAY CONSIDER MOVANTS' REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION

FISC Rule of Procedure 62 permits this Court to publish any of its orders and related

records. The Court has discretion to direct publication of its records *sua sponte* or on motion by a party:

Rule 62. Release of Court Records.

(a) Publication of Opinions. The Judge who authored an order, opinion, or other decision may *sua sponte* or on motion by a party request that it be published. Upon such request, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with other Judges of the Court, may direct that an order, opinion or other decision be published. Before publication, the Court may, as appropriate, direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other decision and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its successor).

(b) Other Records. Except when an order, opinion, or other decision is published or provided to a party upon issuance, the Clerk may not release it, or other related record, without a Court order. Such records must be released in conformance with the security measures referenced in Rule 3.

FISC Rule of Procedure 62(a)-(b).

¹⁰ For this reason, the FISC therefore has "jurisdiction in the first instance to adjudicate a claim of right to the court's very own records and files." *In re Motion for Release of Court Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 487 (FISC 2007).

As this Court has explained, a decision to order publication under FISC Rule 62 lies within the discretion of the Court. In re Opinions and Orders of This Court Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. 13-08 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Nov. 9, 2017) (en banc); In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act, No. MISC. 13-02, 2013 WL 5460064, at *5 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Sept. 13, 2013). "[I]t would serve no discernible purpose for the Court, by rule, to be precluded from considering reasoned arguments in favor of publication of certain opinions made by claimants with Article III standing to seek their publication." In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act, 2013 WL 5460064, at *5.¹¹

Entertaining a request for discretionary publication under Rule 62 is particularly appropriate where the government "declassifi[es] and release[s a] significant amount of information about the context and legal underpinnings of [a] FISC order," and there is "a high level of public and legislative interest" in the order and related materials. *Id.* That "unusual combination of events, among other things, means that non-parties to the [FISC] proceedings have sufficient information to make reasonably concrete, rather than abstract, arguments in favor of publication." *Id.*

II. THERE IS NO LONGER ANY REASON FOR THE PAGE WARRANT ORDERS AND APPLICATION MATERIALS TO BE WITHHELD IN THEIR ENTIRETY AND DISCLOSURE WOULD SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Following publication of the Nunes Memo, there is no longer any reason for the Court to keep its orders related to the surveillance of Carter Page and the related application materials sealed in their entirety. This Court has recognized that the need for complete secrecy of FISC

¹¹ Although Movants do not assert a claim of right in this motion, Movants would have Article III standing to do so. See In re Opinions and Orders of This Court Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. 13-08 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Nov. 9, 2017) (en banc).

records gives way when details about those records are made public. In *In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act*, Judge Saylor directed the government to conduct a declassification review of FISC opinions evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act after a June 2013 opinion construing Section 215 was leaked to the public and the government subsequently disclosed additional information about how Section 215 was implemented. 2013 WL 5460064, at *7–8.

Here, as detailed above, the public now knows (1) that the DOJ and FBI applied for a warrant from this Court for authorization to electronically surveil Page beginning on October 21, 2016, as well the purported grounds on which the government sought the warrant; (2) this Court granted the DOJ and FBI's application on October 21, 2016; (3) the DOJ and FBI thrice requested extensions from this Court to continue surveilling Carter Page; and (4) this Court thrice authorized continued surveillance of Carter Page. *See supra* pp. 4–5. There is no longer any reason why this Court need maintain the entirety of its Page orders and the related warrant applications made public by the President and the HPSCI, release of the orders and materials with appropriate redactions should now be feasible. *See In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act*, 2013 WL 5460064, at *8.

Moreover, continued classification of the entirety of this Court's orders and the warrant application materials is no longer proper in light of President Trump's declassification of the Nunes Memo. Under the current classification regime, information may only be classified when, at a minimum, its "unauthorized disclosure . . . reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security." Exec. Order 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, § 1.2(a)(3). When previously classified information is officially acknowledged and released, continued classification is

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improper, as further disclosure cannot reasonably be expected to cause additional damage to the national security. *Cf. Wolf v. C.I.A.*, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Here, neither information in this Court's records revealing the existence of the Page orders and warrant applications nor the information in the warrant applications detailed in the Nunes Memo are properly classified following the Nunes Memo's release.

In addition, disclosure of the FISC orders and warrant application materials would serve the public interest. When public debate erupted over the scope of Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act after the leak of a June 2013 FISC opinion construing that provision, this Court wisely recognized that the public interest would be served by publishing this Court's opinions on the scope of Section 215. See In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act, 2013 WL 5460064, at *7. Specifically, it recognized that publication "would contribute to an informed debate," would assist federal legislators in representing their constituents and discharging their legislative responsibilities, and "assure citizens of the integrity of this Court's proceedings." Id.

Here, too, publication of the Page orders and application materials serves each of those interests. Publication would contribute to an informed debate about the propriety of the government's FISA application, including whether the government abused its surveillance authority. It would also enable the public to meaningfully evaluate and participate in the ongoing Congressional debate. Majority members of the House Intelligence Committee offer one characterization of the warrant applications, while minority members have offered a competing characterization. Without the underlying application materials, the public is prevented from assessing the relative merits of each position, and will be unable to assess the merits of any additional actions taken by the Committee.

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Publication would also assist federal legislators by enabling them to "represent[] their constituents and discharge[e] their legislative responsibilities." *In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act*, 2013 WL 5460064, at *7; *cf.* Br. of Amici Curiae U.S. Representatives Amash et al., *In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act*, 2013 WL 5460064 (June 28, 2013) (explaining that open debate and the ability to inform the public freely and without restriction is critical to our democratic system and maintaining confidence in the government), available at

http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Misc%2013-02%20Brief-1.pdf.

Finally, publication would assure citizens of the integrity of this Court's proceedings. As noted above, there are currently conflicting reports about whether the government revealed Christopher Steele's political motivations in its warrant applications. *See supra* pp. 5–6 & nn. 7–9. Disclosure of the warrant application materials would inform the public about whether the government deliberately concealed information favorable to Page in its warrant applications.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Movants respectfully requests that this Court direct the publication of its orders authorizing the electronic surveillance of Carter Page, as well as the government's initial warrant application and subsequent renewal applications, with only those limited redactions necessary to maintain the secrecy of non-public information, the disclosure of which could still reasonably be expected to harm the national security notwithstanding the Nunes Memo's publication.

Dated: February 5, 2018

David E. McCraw Vice President & Assistant General Counsel THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY 620 Eighth Avenue By: /s/ John Langford John Langford Hannah Bloch-Wehba MEDIA FREEDOM & INFORMATION ACCESS CLINIC New York, NY 10018 Phone: 212-556-4031 Fax: 212-556-1009

Christina Koningisor THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY Legal Department 620 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10018 Phone: (212) 556-1985 Fax: (212) 556-4634 Email: christina.koningisor@nytimes.com ABRAMS INSTITUTE Yale Law School¹² P.O. Box 208215 New Haven, CT 06520 Phone: (203) 436-5831 Email: john.langford@ylsclinics.org

David A. Schulz MEDIA FREEDOM & INFORMATION ACCESS CLINIC ABRAMS INSTITUTE 1675 Broadway, 19th Floor New York, NY 10019 Phone: (212) 850-6103 Email: schulzd@ballardspahr.com

¹² This motion has been prepared in part by a clinic associated with the Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression and the Information Society Project at Yale Law School, but does not purport to present the school's institutional views, if any.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, John Langford, certify that on this day, February 5th, 2018, a copy of the foregoing

brief was served on the following persons by the methods indicated:

By email and overnight UPS delivery:

Debra M. Guerrero-Randall Litigation Security Group U.S. Department of Justice 2 Constitution Square 145 N Street, N.E. Suite 2W-115 Washington, DC 20530 Debra.Guerrero-Randall@usdoj.gov

By overnight UPS delivery:

Jeffery Sessions Attorney General Office of the Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice National Security Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530

Edward O'Callaghan Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security U.S. Department of Justice National Security Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530

/s/ John Langford

John Langford MEDIA FREEDOM & INFORMATION ACCESS CLINIC ABRAMS INSTITUTE Yale Law School P.O. Box 208215 New Haven, CT 06520 Phone: (203) 436-5831 Email: john.langford@ylsclinics.org

UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT WASHINGTON, D.C. LEEANN FLYNN HALL CLERK OF COURT

IN RE ORDERS AND RECORDS OF THIS COURT RELATED TO THE SURVEILLANCE OF CARTER PAGE

No. Misc. 18–**01**

DECLARATION OF JOHN LANGFORD

1. I am a supervising attorney at the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic ("MFIA Clinic"), which represents Movants Adam Goldman, Charlie Savage, and The New York Times Company in this motion.

2. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in New York.

3. I submit this declaration in support of Movants' motion for publication of court

records.

letter.pdf.

4. Attached hereto as **Exhibit A** is a true and correct copy of the following publicly

available memorandum and cover letter: Memorandum from House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Majority Staff to House Permanent Select Committee Majority Members (Jan. 18, 2018), *available at* https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/memo_and_white_house_

* * * * *

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 5th day of February, 2018, in New Haven, Connecticut.

> By: <u>/s/ John Langford</u> John Langford

U.S. FOREIGH INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANDE COURT 2018 FEB -6 PM 3: 03 LEEANN FLYNN HALL CLERK OF COURT

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EXHIBIT A

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 2, 2018

The Honorable Devin Nunes Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence United States Capitol Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On January 29, 2018, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter "the Committee") voted to disclose publicly a memorandum containing classified information provided to the Committee in connection with its oversight activities (the "Memorandum," which is attached to this letter). As provided by clause 11(g) of Rule X of the House of Representatives, the Committee has forwarded this Memorandum to the President based on its determination that the release of the Memorandum would serve the public interest.

The Constitution vests the President with the authority to protect national security secrets from disclosure. As the Supreme Court has recognized, it is the President's responsibility to classify, declassify, and control access to information bearing on our intelligence sources and methods and national defense. *See, e.g., Dep't of Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988). In order to facilitate appropriate congressional oversight, the Executive Branch may entrust classified information to the appropriate committees of Congress, as it has done in connection with the Committee's oversight activities here. The Executive Branch does so on the assumption that the Committee will responsibly protect such classified information, consistent with the laws of the United States.

The Committee has now determined that the release of the Memorandum would be appropriate. The Executive Branch, across Administrations of both parties, has worked to accommodate congressional requests to declassify specific materials in the public interest.¹ However, public release of classified information by unilateral action of the Legislative Branch is extremely rare and raises significant separation of powers concerns. Accordingly, the Committee's request to release the Memorandum is interpreted as a request for declassification pursuant to the President's authority.

The President understands that the protection of our national security represents his highest obligation. Accordingly, he has directed lawyers and national security staff to assess the

¹ See, e.g., S. Rept. 114-8 at 12 (Administration of Barack Obama) ("On April 3, 2014... the Committee agreed to send the revised Findings and Conclusions, and the updated Executive Summary of the Committee Study, to the President for declassification and public release."); H. Rept. 107-792 (Administration of George W. Bush) (similar); E.O. 12812 (Administration of George H.W. Bush) (noting Senate resolution requesting that President provide for declassification of certain information via Executive Order).

declassification request, consistent with established standards governing the handling of classified information, including those under Section 3.1(d) of Executive Order 13526. Those standards permit declassification when the public interest in disclosure outweighs any need to protect the information. The White House review process also included input from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice. Consistent with this review and these standards, the President has determined that declassification of the Memorandum is appropriate.

Based on this assessment and in light of the significant public interest in the memorandum, the President has authorized the declassification of the Memorandum. To be clear, the Memorandum reflects the judgments of its congressional authors. The President understands that oversight concerning matters related to the Memorandum may be continuing. Though the circumstances leading to the declassification through this process are extraordinary, the Executive Branch stands ready to work with Congress to accommodate oversight requests consistent with applicable standards and processes, including the need to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Sincerely,

Donald F. McGahn II Counsel to the President

cc: The Honorable Paul Ryan Speaker of the House of Representatives

The Honorable Adam Schiff Ranking Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

UNCLASSIFIED	P SECRETARIO PORM	
	January 18, 2018	Declas

Declassified by order of the President February 2, 2018

Subject:	Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Abuses at the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
From:	HPSCI Majority Staff
To:	HPSCI Majority Members

Purpose

This memorandum provides Members an update on significant facts relating to the Committee's ongoing investigation into the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and their use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) during the 2016 presidential election cycle. Our findings, which are detailed below, 1) raise concerns with the legitimacy and legality of certain DOJ and FBI interactions with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), and 2) represent a troubling breakdown of legal processes established to protect the American people from abuses related to the FISA process.

Investigation Update

On October 21, 2016, DOJ and FBI sought and received a FISA probable cause order (not under Title VII) authorizing electronic surveillance on Carter Page from the FISC. Page is a U.S. citizen who served as a volunteer advisor to the Trump presidential campaign. Consistent with requirements under FISA, the application had to be first certified by the Director or Deputy Director of the FBI. It then required the approval of the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General (DAG), or the Senate-confirmed Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division.

The FBI and DOJ obtained one initial FISA warrant targeting Carter Page and three FISA renewals from the FISC. As required by statute (50 U.S.C. §1805(d)(1)), a FISA order on an American citizen must be renewed by the FISC every 90 days and each renewal requires a separate finding of probable cause. Then-Director James Comey signed three FISA applications in question on behalf of the FBI, and Deputy Director Andrew McCabe signed one. Then-DAG Sally Yates, then-Acting DAG Dana Boente, and DAG Rod Rosenstein each signed one or more FISA applications on behalf of DOJ.

Due to the sensitive nature of foreign intelligence activity, FISA submissions (including renewals) before the FISC are classified. As such, the public's confidence in the integrity of the FISA process depends on the court's ability to hold the government to the highest standard—particularly as it relates to surveillance of American citizens. However, the FISC's rigor in protecting the rights of Americans, which is reinforced by 90-day renewals of surveillance orders, is necessarily dependent on the government's production to the court of all material and relevant facts. This should include information potentially favorable to the target of the FISA

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application that is known by the government. In the case of Carter Page, the government had at least four independent opportunities before the FISC to accurately provide an accounting of the relevant facts. However, our findings indicate that, as described below, material and relevant information was omitted.

- The "dossier" compiled by Christopher Steele (Steele dossier) on behalf of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Hillary Clinton campaign formed an essential part of the Carter Page FISA application. Steele was a longtime FBI source who was paid over \$160,000 by the DNC and Clinton campaign, via the law firm Perkins Coie and research firm Fusion GPS, to obtain derogatory information on Donald Trump's ties to Russia.
 - a) Neither the initial application in October 2016, nor any of the renewals, disclose or reference the role of the DNC, Clinton campaign, or any party/campaign in funding Steele's efforts, even though the political origins of the Steele dossier were then known to senior DOJ and FBI officials.
 - b) The initial FISA application notes Steele was working for a named U.S. person, but does not name Fusion GPS and principal Glenn Simpson, who was paid by a U.S. law firm (Perkins Coie) representing the DNC (even though it was known by DOJ at the time that political actors were involved with the Steele dossier). The application does not mention Steele was ultimately working on behalf of—and paid by—the DNC and Clinton campaign, or that the FBI had separately authorized payment to Steele for the same information.
- 2) The Carter Page FISA application also cited extensively a September 23, 2016, Yahoo News article by Michael Isikoff, which focuses on Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow. <u>This article does not corroborate the Steele dossier because it is derived from information leaked by Steele himself to Yahoo News.</u> The Page FISA application incorrectly assesses that Steele did not directly provide information to Yahoo News. Steele has admitted in British court filings that he met with Yahoo News—and several other outlets—in September 2016 at the direction of Fusion GPS. Perkins Coie was aware of Steele's initial media contacts because they hosted at least one meeting in Washington D.C. in 2016 with Steele and Fusion GPS where this matter was discussed.
 - a) Steele was suspended and then terminated as an FBI source for what the FBI defines as the most serious of violations—an unauthorized disclosure to the media of his relationship with the FBI in an October 30, 2016, *Mother Jones* article by David Corn. Steele should have been terminated for his previous undisclosed contacts with Yahoo and other outlets in September—before the Page application was submitted to

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the FISC in October—but Steele improperly concealed from and lied to the FBI about those contacts.

- b) Steele's numerous encounters with the media violated the cardinal rule of source handling—maintaining confidentiality—and demonstrated that Steele had become a less than reliable source for the FBI.
- 3) Before and after Steele was terminated as a source, he maintained contact with DOJ via then-Associate Deputy Attorney General Bruce Ohr, a senior DOJ official who worked closely with Deputy Attorneys General Yates and later Rosenstein. Shortly after the election, the FBI began interviewing Ohr, documenting his communications with Steele. For example, in September 2016, Steele admitted to Ohr his feelings against thencandidate Trump when Steele said he "was desperate that Donald Trump not get elected and was passionate about him not being president." This clear evidence of Steele's bias was recorded by Ohr at the time and subsequently in official FBI files—but not reflected in any of the Page FISA applications.
 - a) During this same time period, Ohr's wife was employed by Fusion GPS to assist in the cultivation of opposition research on Trump. Ohr later provided the FBI with all of his wife's opposition research, paid for by the DNC and Clinton campaign via Fusion GPS. The Ohrs' relationship with Steele and Fusion GPS was inexplicably concealed from the FISC.
- 4) According to the head of the FBI's counterintelligence division, Assistant Director Bill Priestap, corroboration of the Steele dossier was in its "infancy" at the time of the initial Page FISA application. After Steele was terminated, a source validation report conducted by an independent unit within FBI assessed Steele's reporting as only minimally corroborated. Yet, in early January 2017, Director Comey briefed President-elect Trump on a summary of the Steele dossier, even though it was—according to his June 2017 testimony—"salacious and unverified." While the FISA application relied on Steele's past record of credible reporting on other unrelated matters, it ignored or concealed his anti-Trump financial and ideological motivations. Furthermore, Deputy Director McCabe testified before the Committee in December 2017 that no surveillance warrant would have been sought from the FISC without the Steele dossier information.

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5) The Page FISA application also mentions information regarding fellow Trump campaign advisor George Papadopoulos, but there is no evidence of any cooperation or conspiracy between Page and Papadopoulos. The Papadopoulos information triggered the opening of an FBI counterintelligence investigation in late July 2016 by FBI agent Pete Strzok. Strzok was reassigned by the Special Counsel's Office to FBI Human Resources for improper text messages with his mistress, FBI Attorney Lisa Page (no known relation to Carter Page), where they both demonstrated a clear bias against Trump and in favor of Clinton, whom Strzok had also investigated. The Strzok/Lisa Page texts also reflect extensive discussions about the investigation, orchestrating leaks to the media, and include a meeting with Deputy Director McCabe to discuss an "insurance" policy against President Trump's election.

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT WASHINGTON, D.C.

LEEAKN FLYKN HALL CLERK OF COURT

IN RE ORDERS AND RECORDS OF THIS COURT RELATED TO THE SURVEILLANCE OF CARTER PAGE **01** No. Misc. 18–

CERTIFICATION OF BAR MEMBERSHIP AND SECURITY CLEARANCE STATUS

Pursuant to the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's Rules of Procedure 7(h)(1), 7(i), and 63, Movants respectfully submit the following information.

Bar Membership Information

The following counsel for Movants are licensed attorneys and members, in good standing, of the bars of United States district and circuit courts. *See* FISC R.P. 7(h)(1), 63.

David Schulz is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the Supreme Court of the United States; the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits; and the United States District Courts for the District of Columbia, and for all Districts of the State of New York. He is licensed to practice law by the bars of the District of Columbia and the State of New York.

John Langford is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits; and the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. He is licensed to practice law by the bar of the State of New York.

Hannah Bloch-Wehba is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits; and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. She is licensed to practice law by the bars of the State of Texas and the District of Columbia.

David McCraw is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; and the United States District Courts for the District of Columbia and the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. He is licensed to practice law by the bar of the State of New York.

Christina Koningisor is not a member of any federal court but is practicing under the supervision of counsel listed herein. She is licensed to practice law by the bars of the State of New York and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Security Clearance Information

The above-listed counsel for Movants do not hold, and have never held, a security clearance.

Because Movants' motion and the related briefing does not contain classified information, Movants respectfully submits that all undersigned counsel may participate in proceedings on the motion without access to classified information or security clearances. *See* FISC R.P. 63 (requiring counsel only to have "appropriate security clearances").

Dated: February 5, 2018

David E. McCraw Vice President & Assistant General Counsel THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY 620 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10018 Phone: 212-556-4031 Fax: 212-556-1009 By: /s/ John Langford

John Langford Hannah Bloch-Wehba MEDIA FREEDOM & INFORMATION ACCESS CLINIC ABRAMS INSTITUTE Yale Law School P.O. Box 208215 New Haven, CT 06520 Christina Koningisor THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY Legal Department 620 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10018 Phone: (212) 556-1985 Fax: (212) 556-4634 Email: christina.koningisor@nytimes.com

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Phone: (203) 436-5831 Email: john.langford@ylsclinics.org

David A. Schulz MEDIA FREEDOM & INFORMATION ACCESS CLINIC ABRAMS INSTITUTE 1675 Broadway, 19th Floor New York, NY 10019 Phone: (212) 850-6103 Email: schulzd@ballardspahr.com